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Recent controversies over the DSM-5 raise a foun-
dational question for all diagnostic classifications:
what is their underlying purpose? The author raises
this question in the context of the proposed elimina-
tion of the “bereavement exclusion” from the DSM-
5; and the possible addition of the category called
“Complicated Grief.” The author argues that our
psychiatric diagnostic scheme should not be aimed
primarily at establishing boundaries among putative
“natural types.” Rather, it ought to be guided by the
principle of “instrumental validity,” which focuses
on reducing the suffering and incapacity of those
who seek our care. In so far as the category of
“Complicated Grief” helps achieve this goal, it will
foster the humane and ethical values that underlie
medical practice.
“Well, while I'm here I'll do the work—and what's
the work? To ease the pain of living.”
Allen Ginsberg 
The thoughtful articles in this issue highlight many
of the scientific and diagnostic questions surround-
ing the concept of “complicated grief.” Along with
the contentious issue of the “bereavement exclu-
sion” in the still-developing DSM-5, complicated
grief (CG) raises important questions regarding the
boundaries between “normal” and “abnormal”
grief, between grief and post-traumatic stress dis-
order (PTSD), and between CG and major depres-
sive disorder (MDD). 
And yet, important though these “boundary” issues
are, I sometimes wonder if we lose sight of the
underlying philosophical and ethical foundation of
why we have a diagnostic classification in the first
place. Perhaps the obvious answer may be derived
from the Greek etymology of the term “diagnosis”;
literally, the word means “knowing the difference
between.” We create categories in psychiatry in
order to help us tell the difference between condi-
tions we presume exist not only in our patients but,
in some sense, in “Nature.” Here we recognize the
implicit Platonic underpinnings of medical diagno-
sis: we aim, as Plato put it in the Phaeadrus, to
“carve Nature at its joints.” Against this notion of
“natural kinds” is the school of thought known as
“constructivism” or “conventionalism.” This holds
that “natural kinds” do not exist independently of
our own conceptions and mental categories. As
philosopher Andrew Bird
1 colorfully summarizes
the conventionalist argument: “The classifications
of botanists do not carve nature at its joints any
more than the classifications of cooks.”
Psychiatrists have been debating the ontological
status of their diagnostic categories for decades—
famously or infamously so, in the controversial
work of Thomas Szasz.
2,3 But I would argue that our
diagnostic categories—including those of “compli-
cated grief,” major depression, etc—ought to be
aimed only penultimately at demarcating bound-
aries among clinical syndromes. Ultimately, in my
view, our diagnostic categories ought to serve a
humane and ethical purpose: to reduce the amount
of suffering, incapacity, and misery among those
who seek our help.
Diagnostic categories should be our servants, not
our masters. If our diagnostic criteria fail to
improve the lives of those we treat, it matters lit-
tle how many biomarkers we have linked to a par-
ticular set of signs and symptoms; or how high our
rates of “inter-rater reliability” may be. We will
have failed our patients, nonetheless. I have
referred to this ethical-pragmatic approach to diag-
nosis as one of “instrumental validity.”
4 On this
view, a set of diagnostic criteria has high instru-
mental validity insofar as it helps us reduce the suf-
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to whom the diagnosis is applied. 
The issue of instrumental validity has been
brought vividly to the fore in the intense contro-
versy over the so-called bereavement exclusion
(BE), and its proposed elimination from DSM-5.
5
In essence, one group
6 has argued that the BE con-
fuses clinicians and interferes with the diagnosis
and treatment of potentially serious depression
(my own position); while the other
7 has insisted
that eliminating the BE will “medicalize normal
grief” and lead to widespread overprescription of
antidepressants. 
While some of this debate clearly touches on
“boundary” issues—eg, “Where do you draw the
line between normal grief and major depres-
sion?”—the crux of the controversy rests on diver-
gent claims regarding the instrumental validity of
the BE. In effect, the contesting camps view elimi-
nation of the BE as either increasing or decreasing
the net suffering and incapacity of our bereaved
patients. The “non-eliminationists” fear that by
unnecessarily “medicalizing” normal grief and
thereby exposing patients to potentially dangerous
medication side effects, we will do more harm than
good.
7 The “eliminationists” believe not only that
the BE lacks a sound scientific foundation, but also
that it discourages recognition and treatment of a
potentially lethal condition—MDD.
6
Unfortunately, this disagreement cannot be
resolved definitively on the basis of existing stud-
ies of post-bereavement depression, which are
based largely on uncontrolled data, or on epidemi-
ological observations derived from nonclinical sam-
ples.
8We are sorely in need of carefully controlled,
long-term, prospective studies of recently bereaved
(2 to 8 weeks post-loss) patients with major depres-
sive symptoms, compared with comparably
depressed, nonbereaved patients. These cohorts
would be compared with respect to morbidity, mor-
tality, vocational function, and response to psy-
chosocial and somatic treatment. As far as I know,
such studies have never been carried out. That said,
several lines of clinical evidence suggest that post-
bereavement depression meeting symptom and
duration criteria for MDD does not differ substan-
tially from MDD after other types of losses, or after
no loss at all.
6,9
Roughly analogous controversies may arise with
respect to the construct of CG. To be sure, Prof
Shear’s paper in this issue
10 convincingly makes the
case for considering CG as a discrete disorder, dis-
tinguishable from both MDD and PTSD, despite
substantial areas of overlap. And yet, critics will
undoubtedly complain that still another psychiatric
category is being created in the service of “med-
icalizing” grief—what Thomas à Kempis aptly
called, “the proper sorrows of the soul.” A subset
of those critics will, predictably, see the reification
of CG as another example of “disease-monger-
ing”
11—no doubt arguing that it represents yet
another attempt to create a market for pharmaco-
logical “treatment.” For these critics, there may be
no scientific argument that will persuade them of
the contrary. 
Nonetheless, several papers in this issue make a
convincing case for viewing CG as a legitimate
diagnostic category, worthy of effective and com-
passionate treatment. This is so, not because CG
necessarily “carves Nature at its joints”; but
because it usefully identifies a very real instantia-
tion of human suffering and incapacity.
12 To the
extent the construct of CG permits us to reduce
such misery in our grieving patients, it will gain
“instrumental validity” in the sense I have
described. In short, by recognizing and treating this
condition, we may “ease the pain of living” for
those whose grief has gone painfully awry. 
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